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NAFTA Renegotiation and Modernization 
Abstract 
The 115th Congress faces policy issues related to the Trump Administration’s renegotiation and 
modernization of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). NAFTA negotiations were first 
launched in 1992 under President H. W. Bush, who signed the agreement in December 1992, and 
continued under President Bill Clinton, who negotiated additional side agreements on labor and the 
environment. President Clinton signed the agreement into law on December 8 1993, (P.L. 103-182) and 
NAFTA entered into force on January 1, 1994. It is particularly significant because it was the most 
comprehensive free trade agreement (FTA) negotiated at the time, contained several groundbreaking 
provisions, and was the first of a new generation of U.S. FTAs later negotiated. Congress played a major 
role during its consideration and, after contentious and comprehensive debate, ultimately approved 
legislation to implement the agreement. 
NAFTA established trade liberalization commitments that set new rules and disciplines for future FTAs on 
issues important to the United States, including intellectual property rights protection, services trade, 
dispute settlement procedures, investment, labor, and the environment. NAFTA’s market-opening 
provisions gradually eliminated nearly all tariff and most nontariff barriers on goods produced and traded 
within North America. At the time of NAFTA, average applied U.S. duties on imports from Mexico were 
2.07%, while U.S. businesses faced average tariffs of 10%, in addition to nontariff and investment barriers, 
in Mexico. The U.S.-Canada FTA had been in effect since 1989. Trade among NAFTA partners has tripled 
since the agreement entered into force, forming a more integrated North American market. 
The Trump Administration has made NAFTA renegotiation and modernization a prominent initial priority 
of its trade policy. President Trump has viewed the agreement as the “worst trade deal,” and has stated 
that he may seek to withdraw from the agreement. He has focused on the trade deficit with Mexico as a 
major reason for his critique. On May 18, 2017, the Trump Administration sent a 90-day notification to 
Congress of its intent to begin talks to renegotiate NAFTA, as required by the 2015 Trade Promotion 
Authority (TPA) (P.L. 114-26). Negotiations started August 16, 2017. Stating they are committed to an 
expeditious process, negotiators plan to have a series of seven rounds at three-week intervals for a 
conclusion by the end of 2017 or early 2018. The fourth round of negotiations began at the time this 
report was printed. The final text of the agreement will not be released until after negotiations are 
concluded. NAFTA parties have agreed that the information exchanged in the context of the negotiations, 
such as the negotiating text, proposals of each government, and other materials related to the substance 
of the negotiations, must remain confidential. 
Congress will likely continue to be a major participant in shaping and potentially considering an updated 
NAFTA. Key issues for Congress in regard to the renegotiation or modernization include the constitutional 
authority of Congress over international trade, its role in revising or withdrawing from the agreement, the 
U.S. negotiating objectives, the impact on U.S. industries and the U.S. economy, the negotiating objectives 
of Canada and Mexico, and the impact on broader relations with Canada and Mexico. The outcome of 
these negotiations will have implications for the future direction of U.S. trade policy under President 
Trump. 
NAFTA renegotiation may provide opportunities to address issues not covered in the original text. 
Technology and industrial production processes have changed significantly since it was negotiated. The 
widespread use of the Internet has affected economic activities and the use of e-commerce, for example. 
A modernization could incorporate elements of more recent U.S. FTAs, such as digital and services trade 
and enhanced IPR protection. Many U.S. manufacturers, services providers, and agricultural producers 
oppose efforts to eliminate NAFTA and ask that the Trump Administration strive to “do no harm” in the 
negotiations because they have much to lose if the United States pulls out of the agreement. Other 
groups contend that NAFTA should be rewritten to include stronger and more enforceable labor 
protections, provisions on currency manipulation, and stricter rules of origin. 
Keywords 
North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA, Canada, Mexico, trade policy, renegotiation, 
modernization 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Villarreal, M. A., & Fergusson, I. F. (2017). NAFTA renegotiation and modernization (CRS Report R44981). 
Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace/1967 
  
NAFTA Renegotiation and Modernization 
M. Angeles Villarreal 
Specialist in International Trade and Finance 
Ian F. Fergusson 
Specialist in International Trade and Finance 
October 12, 2017 
Congressional Research Service 
7-5700 
www.crs.gov 
R44981 
NAFTA Renegotiation and Modernization 
 
Congressional Research Service 
Summary 
The 115th Congress faces policy issues related to the Trump Administration’s renegotiation and 
modernization of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). NAFTA negotiations 
were first launched in 1992 under President H. W. Bush, who signed the agreement in December 
1992, and continued under President Bill Clinton, who negotiated additional side agreements on 
labor and the environment. President Clinton signed the agreement into law on December 8 1993, 
(P.L. 103-182) and NAFTA entered into force on January 1, 1994. It is particularly significant 
because it was the most comprehensive free trade agreement (FTA) negotiated at the time, 
contained several groundbreaking provisions, and was the first of a new generation of U.S. FTAs 
later negotiated. Congress played a major role during its consideration and, after contentious and 
comprehensive debate, ultimately approved legislation to implement the agreement. 
NAFTA established trade liberalization commitments that set new rules and disciplines for future 
FTAs on issues important to the United States, including intellectual property rights protection, 
services trade, dispute settlement procedures, investment, labor, and the environment. NAFTA’s 
market-opening provisions gradually eliminated nearly all tariff and most nontariff barriers on 
goods produced and traded within North America. At the time of NAFTA, average applied U.S. 
duties on imports from Mexico were 2.07%, while U.S. businesses faced average tariffs of 10%, 
in addition to nontariff and investment barriers, in Mexico. The U.S.-Canada FTA had been in 
effect since 1989. Trade among NAFTA partners has tripled since the agreement entered into 
force, forming a more integrated North American market.  
The Trump Administration has made NAFTA renegotiation and modernization a prominent initial 
priority of its trade policy. President Trump has viewed the agreement as the “worst trade deal,” 
and has stated that he may seek to withdraw from the agreement. He has focused on the trade 
deficit with Mexico as a major reason for his critique. On May 18, 2017, the Trump 
Administration sent a 90-day notification to Congress of its intent to begin talks to renegotiate 
NAFTA, as required by the 2015 Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) (P.L. 114-26). Negotiations 
started August 16, 2017. Stating they are committed to an expeditious process, negotiators plan to 
have a series of seven rounds at three-week intervals for a conclusion by the end of 2017 or early 
2018. The fourth round of negotiations began at the time this report was printed. The final text of 
the agreement will not be released until after negotiations are concluded. NAFTA parties have 
agreed that the information exchanged in the context of the negotiations, such as the negotiating 
text, proposals of each government, and other materials related to the substance of the 
negotiations, must remain confidential.  
Congress will likely continue to be a major participant in shaping and potentially considering an 
updated NAFTA. Key issues for Congress in regard to the renegotiation or modernization include 
the constitutional authority of Congress over international trade, its role in revising or 
withdrawing from the agreement, the U.S. negotiating objectives, the impact on U.S. industries 
and the U.S. economy, the negotiating objectives of Canada and Mexico, and the impact on 
broader relations with Canada and Mexico. The outcome of these negotiations will have 
implications for the future direction of U.S. trade policy under President Trump. 
NAFTA renegotiation may provide opportunities to address issues not covered in the original text. 
Technology and industrial production processes have changed significantly since it was 
negotiated. The widespread use of the Internet has affected economic activities and the use of e-
commerce, for example. A modernization could incorporate elements of more recent U.S. FTAs, 
such as digital and services trade and enhanced IPR protection. Many U.S. manufacturers, 
services providers, and agricultural producers oppose efforts to eliminate NAFTA and ask that the 
Trump Administration strive to “do no harm” in the negotiations because they have much to lose 
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if the United States pulls out of the agreement. Other groups contend that NAFTA should be 
rewritten to include stronger and more enforceable labor protections, provisions on currency 
manipulation, and stricter rules of origin. 
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Introduction 
The 115th Congress, in both its legislative and oversight capacities, faces numerous trade policy 
issues related to the renegotiation and modernization of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA).1 First launched under President George H. W. Bush, the NAFTA 
Implementation Act was signed into law by President William J. Clinton on December 8, 1993 
(P.L. 103-182). NAFTA entered into force on January 1, 1994. NAFTA is significant because it 
was the first free trade agreement (FTA) among two wealthy countries and a low-income country 
and because it established trade liberalization commitments that led the way in setting new rules 
and disciplines for future trade agreements on issues important to the United States. These 
include provisions on intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, services trade, agriculture, 
dispute settlement procedures, investment, labor, and the environment. NAFTA addressed policy 
issues that were new to FTAs and for concluding major multilateral trade negotiations under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). The United States now has 14 FTAs with 20 countries.  
Another important element of NAFTA is that it helped “lock in” trade and investment 
liberalization efforts taking place at the time, especially in Mexico. For decades prior to NAFTA, 
Mexico relied on protectionist trade and investment policies that were intended to foster 
economic growth and to protect itself from a perceived risk of foreign domination. That approach, 
however, failed to achieve the intended outcomes. NAFTA was instrumental in developing closer 
U.S. relations not only with Mexico, but also with Canada, and may have accelerated ongoing 
trade and investment trends. Since NAFTA, the three countries have made efforts to cooperate on 
issues of mutual interest, including trade and investment, and also in other, broader aspects of the 
relationship, such as regulatory cooperation, industrial competitiveness, trade facilitation, border 
environmental cooperation, and security.  
NAFTA’s market-opening provisions gradually eliminated nearly all tariff and most nontariff 
barriers on goods produced and traded within North America. At the start of NAFTA, average 
applied U.S. duties on imports from Mexico were 2.07% and over 50% of U.S. imports from 
Mexico entered duty free. In contrast, the United States faced higher tariff, nontariff, and 
investment barriers in Mexico.2 Trade among NAFTA partners has more than tripled since the 
agreement entered into force, forming integrated production chains among all three countries. 
Many trade policy experts and economists give credit to NAFTA for expanding trade and 
economic linkages among parties, creating more efficient production processes, increasing the 
availability of lower-priced and greater choice of consumer goods, and improving living 
standards and working conditions.3 Others blame FTAs for disappointing employment trends, a 
decline in U.S. wages, and for not having done enough to improve labor standards and 
environmental conditions abroad.4  
                                                 
1 For more information on NAFTA, see CRS In Focus IF10047, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), by 
M. Angeles Villarreal. 
2 Most of the market-opening measures resulting from NAFTA were between the United States and Mexico, and 
Canada and Mexico, because the United States and Canada had a free trade agreement at the time that had been in 
effect since 1989. 
3 For example, see Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Cathleen Cimino, and Tyler Moran, NAFTA at 20: Misleading Charges and 
Positive Achievements, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Number PB14-13, May 2014; and U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce, NAFTA Triumphant: Assessing Two Decades of Gains in Trade, Growth, and Jobs, October 2015. 
4 For example, see AFL-CIO, NAFTA at 20, March 2014; and Robert E. Scott, Carlos Salas, and Bruce Campbell, et 
al., Revisiting NAFTA: Still Not Working for North America's Workers, Economic Policy Institute, Briefing Paper #173, 
(continued...) 
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On May 18, 2017, the Trump Administration sent a 90-day notification to Congress of its intent to 
begin talks with Canada and Mexico to renegotiate and modernize NAFTA, as required by the 
2015 Trade Promotion Authority (TPA).5 Talks officially began on August 16, 2017. President 
Donald J. Trump had stated his intention to withdraw from or renegotiate NAFTA during his 
election campaign and has hinted at the possibility of NAFTA withdrawal since he entered into 
office. He highlights the trade deficit with NAFTA partners as a key issue in his criticism of the 
agreement.  
Congress will likely continue to be a major participant in shaping and potentially considering an 
updated NAFTA. Key issues for Congress in regard to the renegotiation or modernization include 
the constitutional authority of Congress over international trade, the role of Congress in revising 
or withdrawing from the agreement, the U.S. negotiating objectives, the impact on U.S. industries 
and the U.S. economy, the negotiating objectives of Canada and Mexico, and the impact on trade 
and broader relations with Canada and Mexico, two of the United States’ largest trading partners. 
The outcome of these negotiations will have implications for the future direction of U.S. trade 
policy under President Trump. 
At the initial negotiating round, parties 
committed to updating NAFTA’s rules and to 
an expeditious process for concluding the 
negotiations. Negotiators plan to have seven 
rounds of talks that are to be completed by the 
end of 2017 or early 2018. At the time this 
report was printed, negotiators were beginning 
the fourth round of negotiations. Key initial 
differences in specific areas of future 
discussion may make the negotiations more 
complicated and difficult. The United States, 
for example, has raised the possibility of 
updating and strengthening the rules of origin, 
incentivizing the sourcing of goods and 
materials from the United States, adding a five-year sunset provision to NAFTA unless 
affirmatively renewed, and eliminating the Chapter 19 dispute settlement mechanism under 
NAFTA, among other potential contentious provisions. Rules-of-origin issues may be particularly 
contentious and sensitive.  
The final text of the agreement will not be released until after negotiations are concluded. NAFTA 
parties have agreed that the information exchanged in the context of the negotiations, such as the 
negotiating text, proposals of each government, and other materials related to the substance of the 
negotiations, must remain confidential.  
Canada has pushed for stronger regulatory cooperation and a new chapter on environmental 
provisions that includes a commitment to multilateral environmental agreements.6 Canada, in its 
                                                                
(...continued) 
September 28, 2006. 
5 See CRS In Focus IF10038, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), by Ian F. Fergusson. 
6 See Brett Fortman, "Canada Pushing Regulatory Cooperation in Second Round of NAFTA Talks," Inside U.S. 
Trade's World Trade Online, September 3, 2017, and William Mauldin, Paul Vieira, and Dudley Althaus, "U.S. News: 
Canada Takes Tough Line in NAFTA Talks," The Wall Street Journal, September 5, 2017; and Brett Fortman, "Canada 
Seeking Language on Multilateral Environment Agreements in NAFTA," Inside U.S. Trade's World Trade Online, 
(continued...) 
Trilateral Statement after Round One of 
NAFTA Renegotiations 
“While a great deal of effort and negotiation will be 
required in the coming months, Canada, Mexico and the 
United States are committed to an accelerated and 
comprehensive negotiation process that will upgrade our 
agreement and establish 21st century standards to the 
benefit of our citizens.”—From The United States, Canada, 
and Mexico’s Trilateral Statement on the Conclusion of the 
First Round of NAFTA Negotiations, released on August 16, 
2017. 
Source: USTR, at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-
offices/press-office/press-releases/2017/august/trilateral-
statement-conclusion. 
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negotiating objectives, pledged to make NAFTA more “progressive” by strengthening labor and 
environmental provisions, which may raise conflicts with both the United States and Mexico.7 
Canadian Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland stated that NAFTA should have environmental 
provisions that would prevent a country from intentionally weakening climate-change policies to 
attract investment, a proposal with which the United States would likely disagree.8  
Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto stated in his annual state of the nation address on 
September 2, 2017, that Mexico is participating in the negotiations in good faith, but emphasized 
that Mexico “will not accept anything that goes against our dignity as a nation” or Mexico’s 
national interest.9 Mexico has emphasized its desire to modernize the agreement, but has 
cautioned that the region should not turn back to protectionism.10 After President Trump’s 
repeated statements of withdrawing from NAFTA, Mexican Foreign Minister Luis Videgaray 
reportedly stated that an end to NAFTA would mark a breaking point in U.S.-Mexican relations 
and affect bilateral cooperation in other areas.11 Mexico’s set of negotiating objectives prioritizes 
free trade of goods and services, and includes provisions to update NAFTA, such as working 
toward “inclusive and responsible” trade by incorporating cooperation mechanisms in areas 
related to labor standards, anticorruption, and the environment, as well as strengthening energy 
security by enhancing NAFTA’s chapter on energy.12 Mexican government and industry 
representatives say they cannot agree to an agreement that includes increased levels of protection 
and say that “strengthening” the rules of origin by increasing content requirements for the United 
States would make the negotiations very contentious.13  
The U.S. and global economy has changed significantly since NAFTA entered into force 23 years 
ago, especially due to technology advances. The widespread use of the commercial Internet since 
then has dramatically affected consumer habits, commercial activities such as e-commerce, 
supply chain management, etc. A renegotiation could entail updating NAFTA provisions by 
incorporating elements of more recent FTAs that have entered into force, such as the U.S.-Korea 
FTA (KORUS). Negotiators may also seek updated provisions similar to or that may go beyond 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), an FTA the United States negotiated with 11 
other countries, but from which President Trump withdrew after he entered office.14 Mexico and 
Canada, also parties to the TPP, have stated their willingness to use some of the TPP’s 
commitments as a platform for modernizing NAFTA. Discussions could include issues such as 
digital and services trade, stronger labor and environmental provisions, enhanced intellectual 
property rights protection (IPR), trade disciplines for state-owned enterprises, and customs issues, 
among other issues.  
                                                                
(...continued) 
September 3, 2017. 
7 William Mauldin, Paul Vieira, and Dudley Althaus, "U.S. News: Canada Takes Tough Line in NAFTA Talks," The 
Wall Street Journal, September 5, 2017. 
8 Ibid.  
9 Ibid.  
10 Personal communication with government representatives in Mexico City, September 25-29, 2017.  
11 Ana Isabel Martinez and David Lawder, "U.S. Businesses Fear NAFTA Doomed; Mexico Warns of Consequences," 
October 10, 2017. 
12 Mexico's Economic Secretariat (Secretaria de Economia), Mexico's Negotiating Priorities for the Modernization of 
NAFTA , Mexico City, Mexico, July 2017. 
13 Personal communication with automotive industry associations and government officials in Mexico City, September 
25-29, 2017. 
14 See CRS In Focus IF10000, TPP: Overview and Current Status, by Brock R. Williams and Ian F. Fergusson.  
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Many economists and business representatives generally look to maintain the trade relationship 
with Canada and Mexico under NAFTA or further improve overall relations and economic 
integration within the region. However, labor groups and some consumer-advocacy groups argue 
that the agreement has resulted in outsourcing and lower wages that have had a negative effect on 
the U.S. economy. Some proponents and critics of NAFTA agree that NAFTA should be 
modernized and that the three countries should reevaluate the agreement, looking at its strengths 
and weaknesses, as they look to the future of North American trade and economic relations. 
These groups, however, have contrasting views on how to revise the agreement.  
This report provides a brief overview of NAFTA and the role of Congress in the renegotiation 
process; it discusses key issues that are likely to be discussed during the negotiations. It also 
provides a discussion of policy implications for Congress going forward. It will not examine 
existing NAFTA provisions and economic relations in depth. For more information on these 
issues, please see CRS Report R42965, The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), by 
M. Angeles Villarreal and Ian F. Fergusson. 
NAFTA Overview 
At the time that NAFTA was implemented, the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (CFTA) was 
already in effect and U.S. tariffs on most Mexican goods were low, while Mexico had the highest 
protective trade barriers among the three countries. From the 1930s through part of the 1980s, 
Mexico maintained a strong protectionist trade policy in an effort to be independent of any 
foreign power and as a means to promote domestic-led industrialization.15 In 1991, for example, 
U.S. businesses were very restricted in investing in Mexico. Under Mexico’s restrictive Law to 
Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign Investment, about a third of Mexican 
economic activity was not open to majority foreign ownership.16 Mexico’s failed protectionist 
policies did not result in increased income levels or economic growth, and the income disparity 
with the United States remains large, even after NAFTA, as shown in Table 1. NAFTA coincided 
with Mexico’s unilateral trade liberalization efforts. For decades prior to NAFTA, Mexico relied 
on protectionist trade and investment policies that were intended to help foster domestic growth 
and to protect itself from a perceived risk of foreign domination. This approach, however, failed 
to achieve the intended outcome. Through NAFTA, the United States and Canada gained greater 
access to the Mexican market, which was the fastest-growing major export market for U.S. goods 
and services at the time.17 NAFTA also opened up the U.S. market to increased imports from 
Mexico and Canada, creating one of the largest free trade areas in the world.  
                                                 
15 For more information on Mexico’s trade policies, see CRS Report R40784, Mexico’s Free Trade Agreements, by M. 
Angeles Villarreal. 
16 CRS Report R42965, The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), by M. Angeles Villarreal and Ian F. 
Fergusson. 
17 United States International Trade Commission (USITC), Potential Impact on the U.S. Economy and Selected 
Industries of the North American Free-Trade Agreement, USITC Publication 2596, January 1993. 
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Table 1. Selected Economic Indicators for Mexico, Canada, and the United States 
1994 and 2017 
 
Mexico Canada United States 
1994 2017  1994 2017 1994 2017 
Population (millions) 92 129 29 37 263 327 
Nominal GDP (US$ billions)a 508 1,148 548 1,627 7,309 19,371 
Nominal GDP, PPP Basis (US$ billions)b 790 2,372 654 1,671 7,309 19,371 
Per Capita GDP (US$) 5,499 8,890 19,914 44,415 27,777 59,332 
Per Capita GDP in $PPP 8,555 18,370 22,531 45,630 27,777 59,330 
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 14% 37% 33% 31% 10% 12% 
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 18% 39% 32% 34% 11% 15% 
Source: Compiled by CRS based on data from Economist Intelligence unit (EIU) online database. 
Notes: Some figures for 2017 are estimates. 
a. Nominal GDP is calculated by EIU based on figures from World Bank and World Development Indicators. 
b. PPP refers to purchasing power parity, which reflects the purchasing power of foreign currencies in U.S. 
dollars.  
Key NAFTA Provisions 
Some key NAFTA provisions include tariff and nontariff trade liberalization, rules of origin, 
commitments on services trade and foreign investment, intellectual property rights (IPR) 
protection, government procurement rules, and dispute resolution. Labor and environmental 
provisions are included in separate NAFTA side agreements. NAFTA provisions and rules 
governing trade were groundbreaking in a number of areas, particularly in regard to enforceable 
rules and disciplines that were included in a trade agreement for the first time. There were almost 
no FTAs in place worldwide at the time, and NAFTA influenced subsequent agreements 
negotiated by the United States and other countries, especially at the multilateral level in light of 
the then-pending Uruguay Round of major multilateral trade liberalization negotiations. 
The market-opening provisions of the agreement gradually eliminated nearly all tariffs and most 
nontariff barriers on goods produced and traded within North America, mostly over a period of 10 
years after it entered into force. Some tariffs were eliminated immediately, while others were 
phased out in various schedules of 5 to 15 years. Most of the market-opening measures from 
NAFTA resulted in the removal of tariffs and quotas applied by Mexico on imports from the 
United States and Canada. The average applied U.S. duty18 for all imports from Mexico was 
2.07% in 1993.19 Moreover, many Mexican products entered the United States duty-free under the 
U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). In 1993, over 50% of U.S. imports from Mexico 
entered the United States duty-free. In contrast, the United States faced considerably higher tariffs 
and substantial nontariff barriers on exports to Mexico. In 1993, Mexico’s average applied tariff 
on all imports from the United States was 10% (Canada’s average tariff on U.S. goods was 
                                                 
18 An average or simple average tariff is an average of a country’s tariff rates. This can be calculated in several ways. 
Most common is the trade-weighted average tariff, which is the average of a country’s tariffs, weighted by value of 
imports. This is calculated as the ratio of total tariff revenue to total value of imports.  
19 Executive Office of the President, Study on the Operation and Effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 
July 1997, pp. 6-7. 
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0.37%).20 Also affecting U.S.-Mexico trade were both countries’ sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
rules, Mexican import licensing requirements, and U.S. marketing orders.21 The market opening 
that occurred after NAFTA is likely a factor in the significance of trade for Mexico’s economy. In 
1994, Mexico’s exports and imports equaled 14% and 18%, respectively, of GDP, while in 2017, 
these percentages increased to 37% and 39%. For the United States, trade is less significant for 
the economy, with the value of imports and exports equaling 15% and 12%, respectively, of GDP 
in 2017 (see Table 1).  
NAFTA rules, disciplines and nontariff provisions include the following: 
 Investment. NAFTA removed significant investment barriers in Mexico, ensured 
basic protections for NAFTA investors, and provided a mechanism for the 
settlement of disputes between investors and a NAFTA country. NAFTA 
provided for national and “nondiscriminatory treatment” for foreign investment 
by NAFTA parties in certain sectors of other NAFTA countries. The agreement 
included country-specific liberalization commitments and exceptions to national 
treatment. Exemptions from NAFTA included the energy sector in Mexico, in 
which the Mexican government reserved the right to prohibit private investment 
or foreign participation in the energy sector.22 
 Services Trade. NAFTA services provisions established a set of basic rules and 
obligations in services trade among partner countries. The agreement granted 
services providers certain rights concerning nondiscriminatory treatment, cross-
border sales and entry, investment, and access to information. However, there 
were certain exclusions and reservations by each country. These included 
maritime shipping (United States), film and publishing (Canada), and oil and gas 
drilling (Mexico).23 NAFTA liberalized certain service sectors in Mexico, 
particularly financial services, which profoundly altered its banking sector.24  
 Financial and Telecommunications Services. Under NAFTA, Canada extended 
an exemption granted to the United States, under the CFTA, to Mexico in which 
Mexican banks would not be subject to Canadian investment restrictions. In turn, 
Mexico agreed to permit financial firms from another NAFTA country to 
establish financial institutions in Mexico, subject to certain market-share limits 
applied during a transition period ending by the year 2000. In 
telecommunications, NAFTA partners agreed to exclude provision of, but not the 
use of, basic telecommunications services. NAFTA granted a “bill of rights” for 
the providers and users of telecommunications services, including access to 
public telecommunications services; connection to private lines that reflect 
economic costs and available on a flat-rate pricing basis; and the right to choose, 
                                                 
20 Ibid. Canadian tariffs on U.S. goods at the time of NAFTA were low due to the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement 
that had been in effect since January 1, 1989.  
21 Marketing orders and agreements are U.S. Department of Agriculture-sponsored agreements among domestic 
producers to help provide stable markets for dairy products, fruits, vegetables and specialty crops (see 
https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/moa). Prior to NAFTA, the most significant Mexican exports that were 
limited by U.S. marketing orders included tomatoes, onions, avocados, grapefruit, oranges, olives, and table grapes. 
22 Ibid., pp. 30-32.  
23 United States General Accounting Office (GAO, now called Government Accountability Office), “North American 
Free Trade Agreement: Assessment of Major Issues, Volume 2,” Report to the Congress, September 1993, pp. 35-36.  
24 Hufbauer and Schott, NAFTA Revisited, pp. 28. 
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purchase, or lease terminal equipment best suited to their needs.25 NAFTA did not 
require parties to authorize a person of another NAFTA country to provide or 
operate telecommunications transport networks or services. Nor did it bar a party 
from maintaining a monopoly provider of public networks or services, such as 
Telmex, Mexico’s dominant telecommunications company.26 
 Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Protection. NAFTA was the first U.S. FTA 
to include IPR protection provisions. It built upon the then-ongoing Uruguay 
Round negotiations that would create the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement in the WTO and on various existing 
international intellectual property treaties. The agreement set specific enforceable 
commitments by NAFTA parties regarding the protection of copyrights, patents, 
trademarks, and trade secrets, among other provisions. 
 Dispute Resolution. NAFTA’s provisions for preventing and settling disputes 
were built upon provisions in the CFTA. NAFTA created a system of arbitration 
for resolving disputes that included initial consultations, taking the issue to the 
NAFTA Trade Commission, or going through arbitral panel proceedings.27 
NAFTA included separate dispute settlement provisions for addressing disputes 
over antidumping and countervailing duty determinations.  
 Government Procurement. NAFTA opened up a significant portion of federal 
government procurement in each country on a nondiscriminatory basis to 
suppliers from other NAFTA countries for goods and services. It contains some 
limitations for procurement by state-owned enterprises. 
 Labor and Environment. NAFTA marked the first time that labor and 
environmental provisions were associated with an FTA. For many, it represented 
an opportunity for establishing a new type of relationship among NAFTA 
partners.28 Labor and environmental provisions were included in separate side 
agreements. They included language to promote cooperation on labor and 
environmental matters as well as provisions to address a party’s failure to enforce 
its own labor and environmental laws. Perhaps most notable were the side 
agreements’ dispute settlement processes that, as a last resort, may impose 
monetary assessments and sanctions to address a party’s failure to enforce its 
laws. 
Trade Trends 
U.S. trade with NAFTA partners increased rapidly once the agreement took effect, increasing 
more rapidly than trade with the rest of the world. U.S. total merchandise imports from NAFTA 
partners increased from $151 billion to $572 billion (279%), while merchandise exports increased 
from $142 billion to $497 billion (250%) (see Figure 1). The United States had a trade deficit 
with Canada and Mexico of $75.3 billion in 2016, compared to a deficit of $9.1 billion in 1993. 
                                                 
25 GAO, Report to Congress, September 1993, pp. 38-39. 
26 Office of the united States Trade Representative (USTR), Description of the Proposed North American Free Trade 
Agreement, August 12, 1992, p. 29. 
27 If the parties are unable to resolve the issue through consultations, they may take the dispute to the NAFTA Trade 
Commission, which is comprised of Ministers or cabinet-level officers designated by each country. A party may also 
request the establishment of an arbitral panel, which may make recommendations for the resolution of the dispute. 
28 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, NAFTA at 10: Progress, Potential, and Precedents, pp. 20-30.  
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Trade in crude oil and petroleum products is a central component of trilateral trade. If these 
products are excluded from the trade balance, the deficit with NAFTA partners is lower than the 
overall trade deficit in some years. For example, the nonpetroleum merchandise trade balance 
with Canada and Mexico went from a surplus of $8.7 billion in 2013 to a deficit of $49.8 billion 
in 2016.29 Services trade with NAFTA partners has also increased. The United States had a 
services trade surplus with Canada and Mexico of $31.4 billion in 2016 (see Figure 2). 
Figure 1. U.S. Merchandise Trade with NAFTA Partners: 1994-2016 
(billions of nominal dollars) 
 
Source: Compiled by CRS using trade data from the U.S. International Trade Commission’s Interactive Tariff 
and Trade Data Web, at http://dataweb.usitc.gov. 
 
                                                 
29 For more information, see CRS Report R42965, The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), by M. 
Angeles Villarreal and Ian F. Fergusson.  
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Figure 2. U.S. Services and Merchandise Trade Balance with NAFTA Partners 
(billions of nominal dollars) 
 
Source: Compiled by CRS using trade data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis at http://www.bea.gov 
and the U.S. International Trade Commission’s (USITC’s) Interactive Tariff and Trade Data Web, at 
http://dataweb.usitc.gov.  
 
Trade in Value Added 
Conventional measures of international trade do not always reflect the flows of goods and 
services within global production chains. For example, some auto trade experts claim that auto 
parts and components may cross the borders of NAFTA countries as many as eight times before 
being installed in a final assembly plant in a NAFTA country.30 Traditional trade statistics include 
the value of the parts every time they cross the border and count the value multiple times. The 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) developed a Trade in Value Added (TiVA) database, which presents 
indicators that provide insight into domestic and foreign value added content of gross exports by 
an exporting industry.31 These statistics provide a more detailed picture of the location where 
value is added during the various stages of production. U.S. trade with Canada and Mexico is 
diverse and complex since a final good sold in the market could have a combination of value 
added from all three countries, or from other trading partners. The most recent TiVA data 
available (2011) for trade in goods and services indicate that the conventional measurement puts 
the total U.S. trade deficit (including goods and services) with NAFTA countries at $135 billion, 
while the TiVA methodology puts the deficit at $79.8 billion (see Figure 3). 
                                                 
30 Center for Automotive Research, NAFTA Briefing: Trade Benefits to the Automotive Industry and Potential 
Consequences of Withdrawal from the Agreement, January 2017. 
31 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
Trade in Value Added, available at: http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/measuringtradeinvalue-addedanoecd-
wtojointinitiative.htm. 
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Figure 3. U.S. Total Trade and Value Added Balances with NAFTA Countries: 1995-
2011 
(billions of nominal dollars) 
 
Source: Compiled by CRS using data from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD)/World Trade Organization (WTO) Trade in Value Added (TiVA) 2016 
indicators. 
Notes: Data are the most recent available and include trade in goods and services. Totals in this figure 
may differ from USITC data cited in other sections of this report because of differences in 
methodology used by different sources.  
Merchandise Trade in Selected Industries 
NAFTA removed Mexico’s protectionist policies in the auto sector and was instrumental in the 
integration of the motor vehicle industry in all three countries. The sector experienced some of 
the most significant changes in trade following the agreement. Motor vehicles and motor vehicle 
parts rank first among leading exports to and imports from NAFTA countries as shown in Figure 
4. Agriculture trade also expanded after NAFTA, but to a lesser degree than the motor vehicle 
industry. The trade balance in agriculture also has a far lower trade deficit. Trade trends by sector 
indicate that NAFTA achieved many of the trade and economic benefits that proponents claimed 
it would bring, although there have been adjustment costs. It is difficult to isolate the effects of 
NAFTA to quantify the effects on trade in specific industries because other factors, such as 
economic growth and currency fluctuations, also affect trade.  
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Figure 4. U.S. Trade with NAFTA Partners in Selected Industries 
(billions of nominal dollars) 
 
Source: Compiled by CRS using data from the U.S. International Trade Commission, U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, International Trade Administration’s Office of Textiles and Apparel.    
NAFTA Renegotiation Process 
Under Article II of the Constitution, the President has the authority, with the advice and consent 
of the Senate, to make treaties. Under Article I, Section 8, Congress has the authority to lay and 
collect duties, and to regulate commerce. Because renegotiation could require changes to U.S. 
law to take effect, the President may seek expedited treatment of the implementing legislation of 
a renegotiated NAFTA under the Bipartisan Comprehensive Trade Promotion and Accountability 
Act of 2015 (TPA), if the agreement advances U.S. trade negotiating objectives and meets 
specific consultation, notification, and other requirements.32 On May 18, 2017, the Trump 
Administration sent a 90-day notification to Congress of its intent to begin talks with Mexico and 
Canada to renegotiate and modernize the free trade agreement as required by TPA.33 NAFTA 
provides, “The Parties may agree on any modification of or addition to this Agreement. When so 
agreed, and approved in accordance with the applicable legal procedures of each party, a 
modification or addition shall constitute an integral part of the agreement.”34  
Under TPA, the President must consult with Congress before giving the required 90-day notice of 
his intention to start negotiations.35 The Trump Administration’s consultations included meetings 
between U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer and members of the House Ways and 
Means Committee and Senate Finance Committee and with members of the House and Senate 
Advisory Groups on Negotiations.36 The Office of the United States Trade Representative 
                                                 
32 P.L. 114-26. 
33 See CRS Report R42965, The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), by M. Angeles Villarreal and Ian F. 
Fergusson, and CRS In Focus IF10038, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), by Ian F. Fergusson.  
34 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Article 2202, https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/Legal-Texts/
North-American-Free-Trade-Agreement. 
35 CRS In Focus IF10297, TPP-Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) Timeline, by Ian F. Fergusson. 
36 These groups were created by TPA to provide additional opportunities for consultation with the committees of 
jurisdiction, as well as other committees with jurisdiction over potential subject matter in the trade agreement. 
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(USTR) held public hearings and has received more than 12,000 public comments on NAFTA 
renegotiation.37 
In order to use the expedited procedures of TPA, the President must notify and consult with 
Congress before initiating and during negotiations, and adhere to several reporting requirements 
following the conclusion of any negotiations resulting in an agreement. The President must 
conduct the negotiations based on the negotiating objectives set forth by Congress in the 2015 
TPA authority. On July 17, 2017, USTR published a summary of the Trump Administration’s 
specific objectives with respect to the negotiations.38 Negotiations with Mexico and Canada 
began on August 16, 2017.  
At the first round, all parties indicated their intention to conclude the negotiations in a timely 
fashion; however, key differences on specific issues may make this challenging to achieve. 
Possible Topics of NAFTA Renegotiation 
NAFTA is 23 years old and renegotiation provides opportunities to address issues not currently 
covered in the original text, such as e-commerce or more enforceable labor and environmental 
provisions. The following selective topics could be discussed in the context of the renegotiation. 
Where relevant, a comparison is provided between existing NAFTA provisions and provisions 
negotiated in the TPP, which was the latest FTA negotiated by the United States. The TPP is 
relevant to this discussion because Canada and Mexico were participants in the TPP negotiations 
and have indicated they would be receptive to using TPP as a starting point for modernizing and 
renegotiating NAFTA. Because the three parties have agreed that all information exchanged in 
the context of the NAFTA negotiations, including the negotiating text, must remain confidential, 
authoritative information on the status of the negotiations is not yet available.  
Trade Deficit Reduction 
The Trump Administration, for the first time in the negotiating objectives of an FTA, indicated its 
aim to improve the U.S. trade balance and reduce the trade deficit with NAFTA countries in the 
renegotiation of NAFTA.39 The trade balance with NAFTA partners has fluctuated since the 
agreement entered into force, increasing from $9.1 billion in 1993 to a high of $139.0 billion in 
2008, and then decreasing to $75.3 billion in 2016. President Trump and some officials within his 
Administration believe that trade deficits are detrimental to the U.S. economy.40 USTR Robert 
Lighthizer stated after the second round of negotiations that while he wanted to negotiate an 
agreement that is approved by Congress, he also wanted to bring down the trade deficit, as part of 
                                                 
37 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Summary of Objectives for the NAFTA Renegotiation, July 17, 
2017, p. 2, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2017/july/ustr-releases-nafta-negotiating. 
38 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, “USTR Announces First Round of NAFTA Negotiations,” press release, 
July 19, 2017, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2017/july/ustr-announces-first-round-
nafta. 
39 Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), Summary of Objectives for the NAFTA Renegotiation, July 
17, 2017, p. 4. 
40 Peter Navarro, a Trump Administration trade official states that trade deficits have a negative effect on GDP and 
believes that trade deficit reduction is one of four key factors needed to achieve GDP growth. In a Wall Street Jounal 
commentary, he stated that trade deficits transfer wealth to other countries and contends that “tough, smart negotiations 
is [sic] a way to increase net exports—and boost the rate of economic growth.” See Peter Navarro, "Why the White 
House Worries About Trade Deficits," The Wall Street Journal, March 5, 2017. 
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his mission, in order to help American workers and farmers.41 Other critics of NAFTA also argue 
that U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs) have contributed to rising trade deficits with some trade 
partners.42  
Economists generally argue that it is not feasible to use trade agreement provisions as a tool to 
decrease the deficit because trade imbalances are determined by underlying macroeconomic 
fundamentals.43 According to some 
economists, a more constructive alternative 
would be to use the NAFTA renegotiation to 
strengthen Mexico’s economy and boost its 
imports from the United States.44 Others 
contend that FTAs are likely to affect the 
composition of trade among trade partners, but 
have little impact on the overall size of the 
trade deficit.45 They argue that trade balances 
are incomplete measures of the comprehensive 
nature of economic relations between the 
United States and its trading partners, and note 
that trade imbalances are determined by 
macroeconomic fundamentals and an 
imbalance between savings and investment in 
the economy.46  
From this perspective, it is not clear how the Administration would expect to reduce the trade 
deficit through the renegotiation. 
Rules of Origin 
Rules of origin in NAFTA and other FTAs help ensure that the benefits of the FTA are granted 
only to goods produced by the parties that are signatories to the FTAs rather than to goods made 
wholly or in large part in other countries. If a U.S. import does not meet NAFTA rules-of-origin 
requirements, it will enter the United States under another import program. In 2017, 53% of U.S. 
imports from Canada and Mexico entered duty-free under NAFTA, while 47% entered under 
other U.S. import programs.47 In the case of NAFTA, most goods that contain materials from non-
NAFTA countries may also be considered as North American if the materials are sufficiently 
transformed in the NAFTA region to go through a Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) change in 
tariff classification (called a “tariff shift”). In many cases, goods must have a minimum level of 
North American content in addition to undergoing a tariff shift. Regional value content may be 
                                                 
41 David Lawder, "U.S. Trade Rep Says in NAFTA Talks He Keeps Trump's Views in Mind," Reuters News, 
September 6, 2017. 
42 Public Citizen, Job-Killing Trade Deficits Surge Under FTAs: U.S. Trade Deficits Grow 462% with FTA Countries, 
but Decline 7% with Non-FTA Countries, March 2017. 
43 C. Fred Bergsten, Trade Balances and the NAFTA Renegotiation, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 
Policy Brief, June 2017. 
44 Ibid. 
45 For more information on the U.S. trade deficit, see CRS In Focus IF10619, The U.S. Trade Deficit: An Overview, by 
James K. Jackson.  
46 Ibid. 
47 CRS calculations based on imports for consumption data from the U.S. International Trade Commission.  
Trilateral Statement after the Second 
Round of NAFTA Negotiations 
“The successful conclusion of these negotiations will 
update NAFTA through new rules that will generate 
important economic opportunities for all three 
countries, fostering further growth in the region for the 
benefit of the three NAFTA partners.”—From The United 
States, Canada, and Mexico’s Trilateral Statement on the 
Conclusion of the Second Round of NAFTA Negotiations, 
released on September 5, 2017.  
Source: Office of the United States Trade 
Representative, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-
offices/press-office/press-
releases/2017/september/trilateral-statement-conclusion-
0. 
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calculated using either the “transaction-value” or the “net-cost” method. The transaction-value 
method, which is simpler, is based on the price of the good, while the net-cost method is based on 
the total cost of the good less the costs of royalties, sales promotion, and packing and shipping. 
Producers generally have the option to choose which method they use, with some exceptions, 
such as the motor vehicle industry, which must use the net-cost method.48  
The Trump Administration has indicated that it would seek stricter rules of origin in the NAFTA 
renegotiation. In the USTR’s negotiating objectives, the Administration states that it would 
“ensure that the benefits of NAFTA go to products genuinely made in the United States and North 
America.” By differentiating goods made in the United States vs. North America, the 
Administration may seek a higher percentage of U.S. content in products in order to receive 
NAFTA benefits. This may be a point of contention with Canada and Mexico since NAFTA does 
not distinguish between U.S. and North American content. Some observers note that tightening 
rules of origin would be costly to consumers and introduce inefficiencies for businesses, which 
could also make goods produced within North America less competitive in global export markets. 
They also contend that it is cumbersome to comply with complex rules of origin that may add to 
trade costs. They argue that these additional administrative costs could lead businesses not to take 
advantage of NAFTA tariff preferences, and rather to import products through most favored 
nation (MFN) tariffs. In particular, this could be true for small businesses since they lack 
knowledge on the NAFTA certification system.49 Some Mexican officials say that a U.S. proposal 
on tightening the rules of origin could lead to a stalemate in the negotiations.50  
Motor Vehicle Industry  
NAFTA phased out Mexico’s restrictive auto decrees, which for many years imposed high import 
tariffs and investment restrictions in Mexico’s auto sector, and opened the Mexican motor vehicle 
sector to trade with and investment from the United States.51 The elimination of Mexican trade 
barriers liberalized North American motor vehicle trade and was instrumental in the integration of 
the North American motor vehicle industry.52 NAFTA phased out all tariffs on automotive imports 
among the three countries, as long as they met the rules-of-origin requirements of 62.5% content 
for autos, light trucks, engines, and transmissions, and 60% for all other vehicles and automotive 
parts.  
Since NAFTA, North American motor vehicle manufacturing has become highly integrated, with 
major Asia- and Europe-based automakers constructing their own supply chains within the 
region.53 The major recent growth in the North American market occurred largely in Mexico, 
which now accounts for about 20% of total continental vehicle production.54 In general, recent 
                                                 
48 CRS Report RL34524, International Trade: Rules of Origin, by Vivian C. Jones. 
49 Caroline Freund, 17-25 Streamlining Rules of Origin in NAFTA, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 
Policy Brief, Washington, DC, June 2017. 
50 Personal communications with officials in Mexico City on September 23-27, 2017. 
51 Beginning in the 1960s, Mexico had a restrictive import substitution policy in which the government sought to 
supply the entire Mexican market through domestically produced automotive goods. The series of auto decrees 
established import tariffs as high as 25%, had high restrictions on foreign auto production, prohibited imports of 
finished vehicles, imposed high domestic content requirements and had export requirements in which a certain amount 
of exports was required for every dollar of imports. 
52 CRS Report R44907, NAFTA and Motor Vehicle Trade, by Bill Canis, M. Angeles Villarreal, and Vivian C. Jones. 
53 Similarly integrated motor vehicle supply chains have evolved in Europe and Asia.  
54 In 1986, Mexican production of cars and light trucks accounted for 2.5% of total North American production. Ward’s 
Datasheet, North America Car & Truck Production, 1951-2016.  
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investments in U.S. and Canadian assembly plants have involved modernization or expansion of 
existing facilities, while Mexico has seen new assembly plants.55  
The United States has stated it will seek to negotiate new rules of origin in NAFTA renegotiations 
and could push for higher U.S. or North American content. Some experts note that this could be 
an area of disagreement with Canada and Mexico since NAFTA’s rules of origin for motor 
vehicles and parts are the highest such requirements of any U.S. trade agreement. In general, 
vehicle and parts manufacturers support retaining the current rules of origin, whereas labor 
groups seek to require a higher percentage of regional content, which they believe would reduce 
the share of parts produced in non-NAFTA countries.  
Economists and other experts contend that if the rules of origin are increased under NAFTA, the 
United States may not achieve the intended consequences. They say trade in motor vehicles 
within North America would likely not be able to meet the new requirements and would be 
ineligible for NAFTA benefits. Industry experts say that it would be more cost efficient for 
manufacturers of motor vehicles and motor vehicle parts to pay the MFN tariff of about 2.5% 
rather than meeting the cumbersome rules-of-origin requirements. They argue that a change in 
rules poses a significant risk to North American auto production, because it is likely that 
manufacturers would not have the supply to meet the new rules and would not be able to remain 
competitive in the market.56 Auto manufacturers in Mexico are concerned that they would lose 
market share to Asian manufacturers.57 For example, the rules of origin in the U.S.-Korea FTA are 
much lower than NAFTA’s and it is possible that motor vehicle producers would shift production 
to South Korea, especially in light trucks.58  
Auto industry representatives advocate certain changes to enhance the agreement, such as 
updating border customs procedures (i.e., trade facilitation measures) and IPR protection, and 
also support the current NAFTA rules of origin. They say that the current rules of origin strike the 
right supply chain balance, promote exports from North America, and reduce costs. The United 
Auto Workers union (UAW) has called for a new agreement to provide more benefits to workers 
in all three signatory countries.59 The UAW supports renegotiation in order to strengthen labor 
and environmental provisions, ensure “fair” trade among all NAFTA parties through more 
enforceable provisions, and enhance provisions on worker rights protection.60 
Agriculture 
NAFTA’s agriculture provisions include tariff and quota elimination, sanitary and phytosanitary 
(SPS) measures, rules of origin, and grade and quality standards.61 NAFTA sets separate bilateral 
undertakings on cross-border trade in agriculture, one between Canada and Mexico, and the other 
between Mexico and the United States. As a general matter, CFTA provisions continued to apply 
                                                 
55 See CRS Report R44907, NAFTA and Motor Vehicle Trade, by Bill Canis, M. Angeles Villarreal, and Vivian C. 
Jones.  
56 Personal communication with motor vehicle representatives and government officials in Mexico City on September 
25-29, 2017. 
57 Ibid. 
58 KORUS’s rules of origin in motor vehicles range from 35-55%. See CRS Report RL34330, The U.S.-South Korea 
Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA): Provisions and Implementation, coordinated by Brock R. Williams. 
59 CRS Report R44907, NAFTA and Motor Vehicle Trade, by Bill Canis, M. Angeles Villarreal, and Vivian C. Jones. 
60 United Auto Workers (UAW), Renegotiating NAFTA, August 11, 2017. 
61 See CRS In Focus IF10682, NAFTA Renegotiation: Issues for U.S. Agriculture, by Renée Johnson, and CRS Report 
R44875, The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and U.S. Agriculture, by Renée Johnson.  
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on trade with Canada.62 Under CFTA, Canada excluded dairy, poultry, and eggs for tariff 
elimination. In return, the United States excluded dairy, sugar, cotton, tobacco, peanuts, and 
peanut butter. Although NAFTA resulted in tariff elimination for most agricultural products and 
redefined import quotas for some commodities as tariff-rate quotas (TRQs),63 some products are 
still subject to high above-quota tariffs, such as U.S. dairy and poultry exports to Canada. Canada 
maintains a supply-management system for these sectors that effectively limits U.S. market 
access. These products were also exempt from Canada-Mexico trade liberalization. NAFTA also 
addressed SPS measures and other types of nontariff barriers that may limit agricultural trade. 
SPS regulations continue to be regarded by agricultural exporters as challenging to trade and 
disruptive to integrated supply chains.64 
In conjunction with agricultural reforms underway in Mexico at the time, NAFTA eliminated 
most nontariff barriers in agricultural trade with Mexico, including import licensing requirements, 
through their conversion either to TRQs65 or to ordinary tariffs. Tariffs were phased out over 15 
years with sensitive products such as sugar and corn receiving the longest phase-out periods. 
Approximately one-half of U.S.-Mexico agricultural trade became duty-free when the agreement 
went into effect. Prior to NAFTA, most tariffs in agricultural trade between the United States and 
Mexico, on average, were fairly low, though some U.S. exports to Mexico faced tariffs as high as 
12%. However, approximately one-fourth of U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico (by value) were 
subjected to restrictive import licensing requirements.66  
The TPP included certain commitments in agriculture that went beyond NAFTA, particularly in 
regard to SPS provisions, commitments relating to scientifically based human health and 
animal/plant safety in the trade of agriculture products. NAFTA parties could consider 
commitments agreed to under TPP that went beyond both NAFTA and World Trade Organization 
(WTO) commitments, such as science-based and transparent regulatory activities, including the 
use of risk analysis to improve the scientific basis of SPS regulation, notifications to importers or 
exporters of shipments detained for SPS issues, or consultative mechanisms to seek quick 
resolution of such detentions involving perishable products.  
U.S. agriculture has a large stake in NAFTA because Mexico is a very significant export market 
for U.S. agricultural products. Still, renegotiating NAFTA could provide an opportunity to 
modernize certain issues affecting U.S. agricultural exporters.67 Potential options could include 
liberalizing remaining dutiable agricultural products that are still subject to TRQs and high out-
of-quota tariff rates; updating NAFTA’s SPS provisions, such as rules regarding the use of 
agricultural biotechnology; adding provisions regarding the use of geographical indications (GIs), 
or placing names that identify specific products based on their reputation or origin (see 
“Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)” section); and addressing outstanding disputes among NAFTA 
                                                 
62 Governments of Canada, the United Mexican States, and the United States of America, Description of the Proposed 
North American Free Trade Agreement, August 12, 1992, p. 12. 
63 Tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) allowed NAFTA partners to export specified quantities of a product to other NAFTA 
countries at a relatively low tariff, but subjected all imports of the product above a pre-determined threshold to a higher 
tariff. 
64 CRS In Focus IF10682, NAFTA Renegotiation: Issues for U.S. Agriculture, by Renée Johnson.  
65 Tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) allowed NAFTA partners to export specified quantities of a product to other NAFTA 
countries at a relatively low tariff, but subjected all imports of the product above a pre-determined threshold to a higher 
tariff. 
66 Business Roundtable, NAFTA: A Decade of Growth, p. 35. 
67 CRS In Focus IF10682, NAFTA Renegotiation: Issues for U.S. Agriculture, by Renée Johnson. 
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parties, including sugar, tomatoes, and country-of-origin labeling (COOL).68 Some farm interest 
groups are urging changes that go beyond those in the TPP. For example, the U.S. Biotech Crops 
Alliance, composed of 13 groups representing various agricultural sectors, states that NAFTA 
renegotiation represents an opportunity to build on TPP by reaching agreement on biotech safety 
determinations and strengthening the protocol on how to treat agricultural shipments with trace 
amounts of unauthorized biotech traits.69 In the third round of negotiations, the United States 
proposed to open so-called “seasonal products,” such as fruit, to dispute-resolution mechanisms 
that may lead to disputes and possibly tariffs, which could hinder Mexican exports, according to 
some observers.70 Mexican officials stated afterward that this could be a deal breaker in the 
negotiations.71 
Services 
The United States has a highly competitive services sector and has made services trade 
liberalization a priority in its negotiations of FTAs, including NAFTA.72 NAFTA covers core 
obligations in services trade in its own chapter, but because of the complexity of the issues, it also 
covers services trade in other related chapters, including financial services and 
telecommunications. NAFTA contained the first “negative list” services chapter in a U.S. trade 
agreement, meaning that all services are covered under the agreement unless specifically 
excluded from it, or unless NAFTA parties reserved a service to domestic providers at the time of 
the agreement. NAFTA also contains a ratchet clause, which means that if a party liberalizes any 
nonconforming measure in the future, that action cannot be reversed. 
NAFTA parties may consider new services commitments, such as those in TPP, including 
commitments to remove barriers to electronic payment card services, electronic signatures, 
mobile telecommunications, international roaming rates, and additional market access in areas 
such as audiovisual services and allowing firms to transmit data across borders.73 The following 
topics could be part of the renegotiation:  
 Financial services. U.S. financial services firms likely will seek greater market 
access in Canada and Mexico, which have reservations to their financial services 
schedules, as does the United States. At the time of NAFTA, Mexico was in the 
process of denationalizing its banking sector. Companies such as MasterCard are 
seeking to guarantee cross-border access to U.S. payments services, such as the 
ability to process transactions in the United States, and the adoption of electronic 
signatures. 
                                                 
68 See section on trade issues in CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and 
Implications, by M. Angeles Villarreal, and CRS In Focus IF10693, Amended Sugar Agreements Recast U.S.-Mexico 
Trade, by Mark A. McMinimy. 
69 Brett Fortnam, "Ag Groups Seek Biotech Rules in NAFTA that go Beyong TPP Provisions," Inside U.S. Trade, June 
16, 2017. 
70 Eric Martin, Josh Wingrove, and Andrew Mayeda, "U.S. Demands Risk Scuttling NAFTA Talks," Bloomberg 
Politics, September 28, 2017. 
71 Personal communication with government representatives in Mexico City from September 25-29, 2017. 
72 For more information, see CRS Report R43291, U.S. Trade in Services: Trends and Policy Issues, by Rachel F. 
Fefer, and CRS Report R44354, Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) Negotiations: Overview and Issues for Congress, 
by Rachel F. Fefer. 
73 For more details, see CRS Report R44489, The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Key Provisions and Issues for 
Congress, coordinated by Ian F. Fergusson and Brock R. Williams.  
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 Telecommunications. U.S. negotiators may seek liberalization of the Canadian 
telecommunications sector, which contains foreign ownership restrictions and 
board of director requirements. Canada also imposes cultural content restrictions 
that require the broadcast and distribution of Canadian-origin content.  
 Express delivery. Although the United States made market access of express 
delivery services a priority in recent FTA negotiations, NAFTA did not contain 
language on express delivery. U.S. negotiators likely will seek greater access and 
removal of barriers to e-commerce and express delivery, including raising the de 
minimis customs threshold among the three countries (see below). FedEx has also 
expressed interest inallowing reciprocal access for trucking services between the 
United States and Mexico.74 
 Labor mobility. NAFTA partners may seek additional temporary access for their 
service professionals, such as accounting, architecture, legal, and medical 
providers, and temporary entry for business personnel. NAFTA partners may also 
seek greater or mutual recognition of the qualifications of their service 
professionals.75 
E-Commerce, Data Flows, and Data Localization 
The role of the Internet in international commerce has expanded dramatically since the 
implementation of NAFTA over 20 years ago. While technological advancements have 
fundamentally changed how firms trade and do business across international borders, new 
barriers have also emerged, which existing trade rules fail to address. New provisions could 
provide North American firms more flexibility in where they process and store data relevant to 
their business, but they also raise questions concerning privacy and unauthorized use of the 
data.76 The USTR negotiating objectives for NAFTA largely track those of trade promotion 
authority and include language for mandating nondiscriminatory treatment of digital products 
transmitted electronically; prohibiting restrictions on cross-border data flows or imposition of 
localization requirements for servers; preventing mandated disclosure of source code; and 
proscribing customs duties for digital products delivered electronically.77  
These provisions were included in TPP, along with provisions requiring criminal penalties for 
trade secret theft (especially for cyber theft), safeguards for cross-border electronic card payment 
services, consumer fraud protection, and coverage of mobile service providers, among others.  
De Minimis Threshold 
The de minimis threshold for assessing customs duties on imported goods is a potential new issue in the NAFTA 
negotiations, one which affects several negotiating areas such as customs, services, and e-commerce. The controversy 
surrounds the threshold customs valuation assessed among the three NAFTA nations for goods entering the country 
(mailed, delivered by courier, transported by distributors, etc.) without charging duty or sales tax. The United States 
                                                 
74 “Comments of Federal Express Corporation,” Docket # USTR-2017-0006, June 2017.  
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exempts duties for shipments under $800 (P.L. 114-125, §901), while Canada’s threshold is C$20 (recently about 
US$15-16) and Mexico’s is $50. U.S. express delivery and e-commerce firms, as well as small businesses that rely on 
those platforms, have sought to have the de minimis threshold raised in NAFTA partner countries. They argue that 
raising the de minimis would expedite shipments, increase sales, and benefit consumers in Canada and Mexico. 
However, retailers in Canada and Mexico have voiced concerns that raising the threshold would adversely affect 
retailers and would open the door to increased duty-free shipments from non-NAFTA countries.78  
U.S. trade negotiating objectives in TPA include language supporting the use of domestic 
regulation for legitimate policy objectives in the digital space and that they should be 
nondiscriminatory, transparent, and the least restrictive on trade. TPP required the adoption or 
maintenance of a legal framework for privacy regimes.79 Currently, the provinces of Nova Scotia 
and British Columbia have restrictions on the storage abroad of public health, education, and 
other public agency data. While USTR has highlighted localization restrictions on procurement 
opportunities for harmonization of the Canadian government’s IT infrastructure under a single 
platform, the procurement opportunities for government IT infrastructure projects are restricted in 
each of the three NAFTA countries.80 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 
As mentioned earlier, NAFTA was the first FTA to contain an IPR chapter, which in turn was the 
model for the WTO Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) Agreement 
that came into effect a year later.81 IPR chapters in trade agreements include provisions on 
patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, geographical indications (GIs), and enforcement. 
NAFTA predated the widespread use of the commercial Internet, and subsequent IPR chapters in 
U.S. FTAs contain obligations more extensive than those found in TRIPS and NAFTA. In 
general, they have followed the TPA negotiating objective that agreements should “reflect a 
standard of protection similar to that found in U.S. law.” The President’s NAFTA negotiating 
objectives reflect TPA-2015 and the aims of U.S. negotiators in the TPP (in some instances the 
negotiated TPP outcomes were less extensive). Based on the Administration’s negotiating 
objectives, the United States may seek additional IPR provisions in the following areas, among 
other possible issues: 
Patents. Patents protect new innovations, such as pharmaceutical products, chemical processes, 
business technologies, and computer software. Updated patent rules could include the following: 
 Patent term extension. Extension for "unreasonable" delays in the patent 
examination or regulatory approval processes. NAFTA allowed countries to 
provide extension but did not define unreasonable. 
 Patent Linkage. A regulatory authority, such as the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, cannot grant approval to market a generic pharmaceutical 
without the patent holder's permission while the drug is under patent.  
 Protection of test data. Patent holders submit test data for regulatory approval 
for pharmaceuticals on which generics may later rely. Exclusivity periods, during 
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79 TPP, Chapter 14.8. 
80 USTR, 2017 National Trade Estimate Report, p. 71. 
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which these data may not be used by generics, may be discussed regarding the 
following:  
 Chemical-based (small-molecule) drugs: In TPP, all three countries agreed 
on five years of data exclusivity for new drugs, and three years for new 
formulations of existing drugs; and 
 Biologics: The United States may seek 12 years of data exclusivity for 
biologics. Canada provides a total of 8 years of biologics data exclusivity 
while Mexico provides a regulatory 5-year period for both chemical and 
biologics. TPP included provisions for an 8-year period of exclusivity or, 
alternatively, 5 years coupled with “other measures ... to deliver a 
comparable outcome in the market.”82 
Copyright. Copyrights provide creators of artistic and literary works with the exclusive right to 
authorize or prohibit others from reproducing, communicating, or distributing their works. Debate 
exists over balancing copyright protections while protecting the free flow of information, with 
digital trade raising new issues: 
 Extension of copyright terms. NAFTA provides life of creator plus 50 years, or 
50 years from publication for most works. In other FTAs, the United States has 
sought an extension of these copyright terms to 70-year periods.  
 Penalties. Negotiations may include penalties for circumventing technological 
protection measures (TPMs), such as encryption.  
 "Fair use." TPP contained new language to "endeavor to achieve an appropriate 
balance" between users and rights holders in their copyright systems, including 
digitally, through exceptions for legitimate purposes (e.g., criticism, comment, 
news reporting, teaching, research).  
 "Safe harbor." More recent FTA provisions protect Internet service providers 
(ISPs) against liability for digital copyright infringement, provided ISPs address 
intermediary liability through "notice and takedown" or alternative systems (e.g., 
"notice and notice" in Canada).  
Trade Secrets. Trade secrets are confidential business information (e.g., formula, customer list) 
that are commercially valuable. In a first for a U.S. trade agreement, TPP parties agreed to require 
criminal procedures and penalties for trade secret theft, including through cybertheft and by state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). 
Geographical Indications (GIs). GIs are geographical names that protect the quality and 
reputation of a distinctive product from a region (e.g., Champagne, Florida oranges). The United 
States may seek to address GI protections that can improperly constrain U.S. agricultural market 
access in other countries by protecting terms viewed as "common." Some U.S. industries, for 
example, are concerned that the European Union is using GIs to impose restrictions on the use of 
common names such as parmesan, feta, and provolone cheeses, which limit U.S. companies from 
marketing these foods using these common names. This goal may be complicated by the recent 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European 
Union, which provides additional protections for GIs in Canada. 
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Enforcement. The United States may seek commitments on civil, criminal, and other national 
enforcement for IPR violations, such as copyright enforcement in the digital environment, 
criminal penalties for trade secret theft and camcording, and ex-officio authority to seize 
counterfeit trademark and pirated copyright goods at the border. Mexico and Canada have voiced 
a willingness to negotiate on more enforceable IPR provisions.  
Investment 
As stated earlier, NAFTA removed significant investment barriers, ensured basic protections for 
NAFTA investors, and provided a mechanism for the settlement of disputes between investors 
and a NAFTA country. U.S. FTAs, including NAFTA, and bilateral investment treaties (BITs) 
maintain core investor protections reflecting U.S. law, such as obligations for governments to 
provide investors with nondiscriminatory treatment, a minimum standard of treatment, and 
protections against uncompensated expropriation, among other provisions.83 Since NAFTA, 
investment chapters in FTAs and the U.S. model BIT clarified certain provisions, including 
commitments to affirm more clearly a government’s right to regulate for environmental, health, 
and other public policy objectives. All three countries may have an interest in revising the 
NAFTA investment chapter to reflect more recent agreements.  
Protections Common to U.S. Investment Agreements  
Market access for investments.  
Nondiscriminatory treatment of foreign investors and investments compared to domestic investors and 
investments (national treatment) and to those of another country (most-favored-nation treatment). 
Minimum standard of treatment (MST) in accordance with customary international law, including fair and 
equitable treatment and full protection and security. 
Prompt, adequate, and effective compensation for expropriation, both direct and indirect, recognizing that, 
except in rare circumstances, nondiscriminatory regulation is not an indirect expropriation. 
Timely transfer of funds into and out of the host country without delay using a market rate of exchange. 
Limits on performance requirements that, for example, condition approval of an investment on using local 
content.  
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) for binding international arbitration of private investors’ claims 
against host country governments for violation of protections in Investment Chapter, along with requirements for 
transparency of ISDS proceedings. 
Exceptions are included, TPP-wide, for essential security interests and prudential reasons, among others.  
 
One controversial aspect of the NAFTA investment chapter is the investor-state dispute settlement 
(ISDS) mechanism. ISDS is a form of binding arbitration that allows private investors to pursue 
claims against sovereign nations for alleged violations of the investment provisions in trade 
agreements. It is included in NAFTA and nearly all other U.S. trade agreements that have been 
enacted since then. Generally, ISDS tribunals are composed of three lawyer-arbitrators: one 
chosen by the claimant investor, one by the respondent country, and one by mutual decision 
between the two parties. Most cases follow the rules of the World Bank’s Centre for Settlement 
for Investor Dispute or the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. Fifty-nine 
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ISDS actions were filed as part of NAFTA during the same time frame, with the majority coming 
after 2004.84 
Supporters argue that ISDS is important 
for removing investment barriers by 
protecting investors from discriminatory 
treatment. They also argue that trade 
agreements do not prevent governments 
from regulating in the public interest; that 
ISDS remedies are limited to monetary 
penalties; and thus that ISDS cannot 
force governments to change their laws 
or regulations. Critics counter that 
companies use ISDS to restrict 
governments’ ability to regulate in the 
public interest (such as for environmental 
or health reasons), leading to “regulatory 
chilling” even if an ISDS outcome is not 
in a company’s favor. The United States, 
to date, has never lost a claim brought 
against it under ISDS in a U.S. 
investment agreement. The USTR’s 
negotiating objectives for NAFTA do not 
mention ISDS, but it is possible that 
USTR will attempt to renegotiate these 
commitments and include provisions 
from more recent FTAs or the negotiated 
TPP.  
Energy 
In most sectors, NAFTA removed significant trade and investment barriers and ensured basic 
protections for NAFTA investors. The agreement, nonetheless, included explicit country-specific 
exceptions and reservations. In NAFTA’s energy chapter, the three parties confirmed respect for 
their constitutions. This was of particular importance for Mexico and its 1917 Constitution, which 
established Mexican national ownership of all hydrocarbons resources. Under NAFTA, the 
Mexican government reserved to itself strategic activities, including investment and provisions in 
such activities, related to the exploration and exploitation of crude oil, natural gas, and basic 
petrochemicals. Mexico also reserved the right to provide electricity as a public service within the 
country. Despite these exclusions from NAFTA, energy remains a central component of U.S.-
Mexico trade.85  
In the NAFTA renegotiations, the United States may seek to lock in Mexico’s recent energy 
reforms, provide greater access to Mexico’s oil sector, and enhance bilateral cooperation on 
energy production and security. Mexico also may seek to enhance NAFTA’s energy chapter. In 
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85 See CRS Report R43313, Mexico's Oil and Gas Sector: Background, Reform Efforts, and Implications for the United 
States, coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke, and CRS Report R44747, Cross-Border Energy Trade in North America: 
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NAFTA Record on Investor State Dispute Settlement 
(ISDS) Cases 
 59 cases adjudicated under Chapter 11 
 23 (39%) decided in favor of state (on merits/no 
jurisdiction); 10 (17%) decided in favor of investor; 8 
(13%) settled 
 7 (12%) discontinued or breach found but no damages; 
pending 11 (19%) 
 Individual cases initiated against United States: 16; Canada 
25; Mexico 18 
 10 decisions favorable to U.S. government as respondent; 
0 decisions unfavorable; 3 settled; 1 discontinued; 2 
pending 
 6 decisions favorable to Canadian government as 
respondent; 5 unfavorable; 5 settled; 4 discontinued; 5 
pending 
 8 decisions favorable to Mexican government as 
respondent; 5 unfavorable; 2 discontinued; 3 pending 
 Home countries of claimants in cases initiated against 
United States: Canada (15); Mexico (1) 
 Respondent governments in cases initiated by U.S. 
investors: Canada (25); Mexico (16)  
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD). 
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2013, the Mexican Congress approved the Peña Nieto Administration’s constitutional reform 
proposals for the energy sector. The reforms restructured Mexico’s state-owned oil company, 
PEMEX, as a “state productive company,” which means that despite being owned by the state, it 
competes in the market like any private company.86 It has operational autonomy in addition to its 
own assets. These reforms opened Mexico’s energy sector to production-sharing contracts with 
private and foreign investors while keeping the ownership of Mexico’s hydrocarbons under state 
control.87 Following this reform, Mexico adopted new procurement rules to increase efficiency 
and effectiveness in the procurement process. U.S. industry groups are calling for the United 
States to use NAFTA’s so-called ratchet mechanism in regard to Mexico’s energy reforms, which 
would prevent the reforms from being reversed and grant protection to U.S. investors.88  
In regard to Canada, negotiators may address a so-called “proportionality” provision contained in 
the energy chapters of both CFTA and NAFTA. This provision provides that a domestic 
restriction on Canadian energy exports cannot reduce the proportion of exports delivered to the 
United States. The chapter also prohibits pricing discrimination between domestic consumption 
and exports to the United States. Some Canadians maintain that this provision restricts the ability 
of Canada to make energy policy decisions and may seek to change this provision. 
Government Procurement 
The NAFTA government procurement chapter sets standards and parameters for government 
purchases of goods and services. The schedule of commitments, set out in an annex to the 
chapter, provides opportunities for firms of each nation to bid on certain contracts for specified 
government agencies over a set monetary threshold on a reciprocal basis. The United States and 
Canada also have made certain government procurement opportunities available through similar 
obligations in the plurilateral WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). Mexico is 
currently not a member of the GPA. 
Supporters of expanded procurement opportunities in FTAs argue that the reciprocal nature of the 
government procurement provisions in FTAs allows U.S. firms access to major government 
procurement market opportunities overseas. In addition, supporters claim open government 
procurement markets at home allow government entities to accept bids from partner country 
suppliers, potentially making more efficient use of public funds. 
However, other stakeholders contend that public procurement should primarily benefit domestic 
industries. The Buy American Act of 1933, as amended, limits the ability of foreign companies to 
bid on procurements of manufactured and construction products.89 Buy American provisions 
periodically are also proposed for legislation such as infrastructure projects requiring government 
purchases of iron, steel, and manufactured products.90 Such restrictions are waived for products 
from countries with which the United States has FTAs or to countries belonging to the GPA. The 
Trump Administration has made it a priority to support strong Buy American and Hire American 
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policies in government procurement. The U.S. trade negotiating objective for government 
procurement in TPA seeks “transparency in developing guidelines, rules, regulations, and laws for 
government procurement,” but does not address market access goals. USTR’s NAFTA objectives 
largely echo these goals by stating general commitments, such as support for “predictable and 
nondiscriminatory rules” that ensure procurement “will be handled under fair procedures” and 
maintain existing exceptions, domestic preferential purchasing programs, and the ability to 
provide for labor, environmental, and other criteria in contracting requirements. 
Increased market access to procurement contracts for U.S. firms in the NAFTA countries is likely 
a major goal for U.S. negotiators. USTR may try to fulfill this objective by seeking to negotiate 
the extension of procurement coverage to additional Mexican and Canadian federal entities, 
which may be contentious because it is not clear that Mexico or Canada would agree to such 
provisions. Another opportunity might be found in negotiating more extensive subfederal 
coverage (i.e., states and local governments) for procurement purposes—as the United States and 
Canada have already covered in the GPA—but the USTR, for now, has specifically stated its 
intention to exclude subfederal coverage from negotiations. It is unclear, however, what new 
procurement opportunities the United States is willing to offer to Canada or Mexico to obtain this 
new procurement access. Canada, in particular, is likely to seek widespread exemptions from Buy 
American policies. Updated provisions in a modernized NAFTA could  
 promote transparency in the tendering process through online tender information 
and descriptions; 
 provide online application and documentation processes without cost to the 
applicant, and provide for publication of postaward explanations of procurement 
decisions; 
 broaden covered procurement to include public-private partnerships (PPP) and 
build-operate-transfer (BOT) projects; and 
 prohibit offsets. 
Dispute Settlement 
NAFTA’s dispute settlement provisions were innovative at the time the agreement was negotiated. 
Under Chapter 20, the agreement created an enforceable state-to-state mechanism, for the first 
time in an FTA, to resolve disputes arising from the agreement. This dispute settlement 
mechanism has rarely been used, in part because the provisions of NAFTA substantially overlap 
with those of the WTO, which came into force a year after NAFTA. WTO dispute settlement has 
been used extensively—over 500 cases brought involving WTO members—due to perceived 
advantages including an appellate mechanism and a growing body of precedent. If NAFTA is 
revised with provisions not in WTO agreements, NAFTA panels may be used more and their 
ability to function properly may be examined in any renegotiation. The pending EU-Canada 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) provisions, for example, would 
establish a new appellate process through an Investment Court System (ICS) to resolve disputes 
between investors and host governments, rather than the ISDS arbitration mechanism in NAFTA. 
ICS, as envisioned in CETA, differs from ISDS in a number of ways, for instance, in that it 
creates a permanent roster of judges and includes an appellate body.91  
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Alone among current U.S. FTAs, NAFTA contains a binational dispute settlement mechanism 
(Chapter 19) that provides disciplines for settling disputes arising from a NAFTA party’s statutory 
amendment of its antidumping (AD) or countervailing duty (CVD) laws, or as a result of a 
NAFTA party’s AD or CVD final determination92 on the goods of an exporting NAFTA party. 
Chapter 19 provides for binational panel review of final determinations in AD/CVD 
investigations conducted by NAFTA parties in lieu of judicial review in domestic courts. In cases 
in which a NAFTA partner did not preserve “fair and predictable disciplines on unfair trade 
practices,” or asserts that a NAFTA partner’s amendment to its AD or CVD law is inconsistent 
with the World Trade Organization (WTO) Antidumping or Subsidies Agreements,93 the 
aggrieved NAFTA partner may request a judgment from a binational panel rather than through the 
legal system of the defending party.94  
Chapter 19 Panels Involving the United States 
As of February 2017, the United States and its industries had been a party to 95% of all Chapter 19 panel reviews 
(139 panels), as either the importing or exporting country. In 71% of these panels (99 panels), the United States was 
the importing country and investigating authority. In these 99 cases, panels reviewed 47 U.S. decisions regarding U.S. 
imports from Canada and 52 U.S. decisions regarding U.S. imports from Mexico. Panels issued a ruling in one-third of 
these cases. Two-thirds of the cases were terminated by one or both of the parties before the panel made a 
determination.  
As the exporting country, U.S. industries requested 40 panel reviews of another party’s investigatory decisions. These 
panels included 20 reviews of Canadian decisions and 20 of Mexican decisions. Two-thirds of these panels completed 
their review and issued a ruling. The remaining one-third were terminated by one or both of the involved parties 
before the panel ruled.  
Source: Evaluated and compiled by CRS using information from the NAFTA Secretariat, available at 
https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/Dispute-Settlement.  
The dispute settlement system in NAFTA Chapter 19 originated during the Canada-United States 
Free Trade Agreement (CFTA) negotiations that culminated in 1988. The system reportedly 
resulted from an impasse in negotiations over the United States’ refusal to provide Canada with 
an exemption from the normal operation of U.S. AD/CVD laws. The provision of an option to 
dispute each other’s proposed changes to unfair trade laws and to challenge the outcomes of 
AD/CVD investigations was important to Canada’s final acceptance of the CFTA.95 Mexico also 
supported including the provision during the negotiation of NAFTA.  
                                                 
92 In Canada, AD/CVD investigations on imports are conducted by the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA, makes 
dumping and subsidy determinations) and the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT, determines injury to 
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The Trump Administration stated in its summary of objectives for NAFTA renegotiation that it 
will seek to eliminate the Chapter 19 dispute settlement mechanism.96 Canada and Mexico 
support keeping Chapter 19 in the agreement. Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau has stated that a 
fair dispute resolution system was essential for any trade pact signed by Canada, including a 
renegotiated NAFTA, while the Mexican Congress has urged Mexico’s negotiators to reject the 
Trump Administration’s proposal to scrap the Chapter 19 dispute resolution mechanism.97 
Supporters of Chapter 19 assert that the process “offer[s] exporters and domestic producers an 
effective and direct route to make their case and appeal the results of trade remedy investigations 
before an independent and objective binational panel” and that it provides for “efficient and 
impartial review of trade remedy determinations.”98 Some legal observers mention that the panel 
process has functioned mainly without difficulty, noting that there have only been major 
disagreements in a limited number of cases, and that dissents have been few.99 Critics mention, 
among other things, that there is effectively no appellate review process within the NAFTA 
dispute settlement system,100 and that the panels are generally composed of individuals who have 
little panel experience and may not be experts in the AD/CVD laws or in the legal system of the 
country whose determination is under review.101 They also mention that, despite a mandated 315-
day deadline for panel reviews, there have been years-long delays prior to the panel process, 
mostly due to difficulties in finding and agreeing on panelists for the binational panels.102 Some 
critics also allege that Chapter 19 decisions have created their own body of AD/CVD laws that 
national judges are encouraged to view as persuasive authority.103  
Labor 
U.S. FTAs include provisions on labor and the environment in an attempt to ensure that 
liberalized trade does not give a competitive advantage to developing countries due to a lack of 
adequate labor and environmental standards. Worker rights provisions in U.S. trade agreements 
have evolved over time.104 NAFTA marked the first time that worker rights provisions were 
associated with an FTA by including labor provisions in a side agreement, the North American 
Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), that required all parties to enforce their own labor 
laws, as well as provisions to encourage greater cooperation. The side agreement includes a 
consultation mechanism for addressing labor disputes and a special labor dispute settlement 
procedure. The enforcement mechanism applies mainly to a party’s failure to enforce its own 
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labor laws. Under provisions of the 2002 TPA, seven subsequent FTAs included a similar 
provision within the main text of the agreement.  
Internationally recognized labor principles were included in FTAs with Peru, Colombia, Panama, 
and South Korea, which required parties to adopt and maintain in their statutes and regulations 
core labor principles of the International Labor Organization (ILO) (ILO Declaration). They also 
required countries to enforce their labor laws and not to waive or derogate from those laws to 
attract trade and investment. These provisions are enforceable under the same dispute settlement 
procedures that apply to other provisions of the FTA, and violations are subject to the same 
potential trade sanctions.  
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998) 
 freedom of association;  
 effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining;  
 elimination of all forms of compulsory or forced labor;  
  effective abolition of child labor; and 
 elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. 
The United States may seek to strengthen NAFTA provisions related to the protection of worker 
rights by adopting these provisions from TPP, which were agreed to by all three NAFTA 
countries. These provisions largely track the Administration’s NAFTA negotiating objectives, 
although the NAFTA objectives also call for “initiatives to prohibit” trade in goods produced by 
forced labor, as well as provisions to allow public stakeholders to raise concerns directly with 
NAFTA governments over alleged derogation from commitments.  
Concerns over NAFTA labor provisions are often discussed in the context of Mexico’s record on 
worker rights. While Mexico has enacted labor laws and undertaken constitutional reforms, the 
challenge has been to enforce those laws. In TPP, the United States signed separate labor 
consistency plans with Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei. The consistency plans would have 
committed those countries to undertake specific legal reforms and implement other measures 
concerning worker rights. Some stakeholders may advocate such a plan for Mexico in 
conjunction with a revised NAFTA, although the United States was unable to negotiate one with 
Mexico in TPP. However, according to the USTR, Mexico had agreed to develop “parallel 
reforms” to make its labor laws consistent with TPP labor provisions in protecting collective 
bargaining and reforming its system for administering labor justice.105 
Environment 
NAFTA was the first U.S. FTA to include a side agreement related to the environment. As with 
the chapter on worker rights, environment provisions in U.S. FTAs have evolved over time. The 
NAFTA side agreement—the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation 
(NAAEC)—requires all parties to enforce their own environmental laws, and contains an 
enforcement mechanism applicable to a party’s failure to enforce these laws. NAAEC includes a 
consultation mechanism for addressing disputes with a special dispute settlement procedure. 
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Seven subsequent FTAs, negotiated under the 2002 TPA, included a similar environmental 
chapter within the main text of the agreement.106  
The President’s NAFTA negotiating agenda largely tracks recent FTAs (South Korea, Panama, 
Peru, and Colombia), the 2015 TPA, and TPP. It seeks to require NAFTA parties to adopt and 
maintain statutes and regulations consistent with multilateral environmental agreements to which 
each is a party; not to fail to effectively enforce their environmental laws through a sustained or 
recurring course of action in a matter affecting trade or investment between the parties; and not to 
waive or derogate from their environmental laws to encourage trade or investment. 
NAFTA parties may also seek provisions to combat endangered species trade; combat illegal, 
unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing; prohibit fishing subsidies; and support inclusive and 
transparent policymaking in the future through rules requiring publication of laws and 
regulations, and facilitate public input into the process. U.S. negotiating objectives do not 
mention climate change policies, but Canada reportedly has proposed to integrate country 
commitments in support of the Paris Agreement and to prevent weakening of climate change 
policies to attract investment. This could be a point of contention with the United States since 
President Trump announced in August that he intended to withdraw from the Paris Agreement.107  
Customs and Trade Facilitation 
Customs and trade facilitation relates to the efficient flow of legally traded goods in and out of 
the United States. Enforcement of U.S. trade laws and import security are other important 
components of customs operations at the border.  
NAFTA’s chapter on customs procedures includes provisions on certificates of origin, 
administration and enforcement, and customs regulation and cooperation. More recent 
agreements have modernized provisions in regard to customs procedures and trade facilitation. 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), the newest 
international trade agreement in the WTO, entered into force on February 22, 2017. Two-thirds of 
WTO members, including the United States, Canada, and Mexico, ratified the multilateral 
agreement.108 Trade facilitation measures aim to simplify and streamline customs procedures to 
allow the easier flow of trade across borders and thereby reduce the costs of trade. There is no 
precise definition of trade facilitation, even in the WTO agreements. Trade facilitation can be 
defined narrowly as improving administrative procedures at the border or more broadly to also 
encompass behind-the-border measures and regulations. The TFA aims to address trade barriers, 
such as lack of customs procedural transparency and overly burdensome documentation 
requirements.109 
NAFTA renegotiation discussions may build on and set standards for implementation of the WTO 
TFA. Talks could address customs automation procedures, examination of de minimus levels for 
expedited customs processing,110 creation of a single-access window at one entry point, 
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automated risk analysis and targeting, expeditious responses to requests for information on quotas 
or country of origin markings, special customs procedures for express shipments, or publicly 
available customs laws. Given the magnitude and frequency of U.S. trade with NAFTA partners, 
more updated customs provisions in NAFTA could have a significant impact on companies 
engaged in trilateral trade.111  
Currency Manipulation 
NAFTA does not have provisions related to currency manipulation. Over the past decade, some 
Members of Congress and policy experts have been concerned that foreign countries are using 
exchange rate policies to gain an unfair trade advantage against the United States, or are 
"manipulating" their currencies. Specifically, the concern is that other countries may purposefully 
undervalue their currencies to boost exports, making it harder for other countries to compete in 
global markets. They argue that U.S. companies and jobs have been adversely affected by the 
exchange rate policies adopted by China, Japan, and other countries "manipulating" their 
currencies.112 Some economists are skeptical about currency manipulation and whether it is a 
significant problem. They raise questions about whether government policies have long-term 
effects on exchange rates, whether it is possible to differentiate between "manipulation" and 
legitimate central bank activities, and the net effect of alleged currency manipulation on the U.S. 
economy.113 
The June 2015 TPA included, for the first time, a principal trade negotiating objective addressing 
currency manipulation. The Trump Administration included a negotiating objective to address 
currency manipulation in a modernization of NAFTA, in line with TPA negotiating objectives. 
The USTR’s summary of the negotiating objectives states a goal of ensuring that “NAFTA 
countries avoid manipulating exchange rates in order to prevent effective balance of payments 
adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage.”114 The U.S. auto industry also supports 
adding currency manipulation provisions to NAFTA.115 Mexico has stated that it is open to 
including a declaration in NAFTA that it would not manipulate its currency.116 Although few U.S. 
stakeholders have raised concerns specifically regarding Mexico and Canada’s currency policies, 
new provisions in the NAFTA modernization could serve as a template for future FTA 
negotiations, similar to TPP. 
Regulatory Practices 
Nontariff barriers, including discriminatory and unpredictable regulatory processes, can be an 
impediment to market access for U.S. goods and services exports. NAFTA includes broad 
provisions on regulatory practices in several chapters, including the Customs Procedures, 
Financial Services, and Energy chapters, but does not have a specific chapter on regulatory 
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practices. NAFTA may have influenced the United States, Canada, and Mexico to increase 
cooperation on economic and security issues through various endeavors such as the North 
American Leaders’ Summits, the North American Trusted Traveler Program, the U.S.-Canada 
Beyond the Border Action Plan, and the U.S.-Mexico High Level Regulatory Cooperation 
Council.117  
The United States may seek to modernize NAFTA with commitments to facilitate market access 
and promote greater compatibility among U.S., Canadian, and Mexican regulations. Such 
commitments could complement ongoing efforts and include increased transparency in the 
development and implementation of proposed regulations, opportunities for public comment in 
the development of regulations, and/or the use of impact assessments and other methods to ensure 
regulations are evidence-based and current.118  
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
NAFTA includes provisions on SOEs, but they are limited in scope. NAFTA provisions allowed 
parties to maintain or establish SOEs, while requiring that any enterprise owned or controlled by 
a federal, provincial, or state government must act in a manner consistent with that country’s 
NAFTA obligations when exercising regulatory, administrative, or other government authority, 
such as the granting of licenses. NAFTA committed parties to ensure that any SOEs accord 
nondiscriminatory treatment in the sale of goods or services to another party’s investment in that 
territory.  
A possible area for NAFTA renegotiations could include discussions on SOEs to address issues 
similar to or beyond those negotiated in more recent FTAs.119 These could include updated 
provisions to ensure that SOEs compete on a commercial basis, and that the advantages SOEs 
receive from their governments, such as subsidies, do not have an adverse impact on U.S. 
workers and businesses. Renegotiations could address potential commercial disadvantages to 
private sector firms from state-supported competitors receiving preferential treatment.120  
Trucking 
The renegotiation of NAFTA may also address trucking provisions. The implementation of 
NAFTA trucking provisions was a major trade issue between the United States and Mexico for 
many years because of U.S. delayed implementation of its trucking commitments under the 
agreement. NAFTA provided Mexican commercial trucks full access to four U.S. border states in 
1995 and full access throughout the United States in 2000. Citing safety concerns, the United 
States delayed the implementation of these provisions for many years. The two countries 
cooperated to resolve the issue over time and engaged in numerous talks regarding safety and 
operational issues. By 2015, the trucking issue had been resolved. The International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters later filed a lawsuit over the implementation of the trucking provisions and may 
want to revise NAFTA’s trucking provisions under a potential renegotiation. 
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Issues for Congress 
There are a number of significant issues for Congress in the renegotiation and modernization of 
NAFTA. Key issues Congress may examine include how best to revise and modernize the 
agreement, and the economic impact and broader strategic aspects of NAFTA and its role in U.S. 
relations with Canada and Mexico, two of the United States’ largest trading partners. Some 
lawmakers have expressed concern that the Trump Administration’s statements on trade have the 
potential to harm North American trade relations, especially in regard to Mexico, and have stated 
that they would like to see a positive outcome to the negotiations that would enhance relations 
with NAFTA partners through a modernized agreement. Other lawmakers have expressed 
concerns about specific aspects of the agreement with a goal of revision, as well as including 
TPP-like provisions to update NAFTA. What follows are a few selected areas of potential 
congressional interest in more detail.  
Roles of Congress and the President in NAFTA Renegotiations 
A possible issue for Congress relates to the roles of Congress and the President in the 
modernization of the agreement. A key issue is the extent to which the President advances U.S. 
negotiating objectives as approved by Congress in 2015, as part of the broader TPA, in addition to 
TPA’s requirements for close congressional-executive branch consultations throughout the 
negotiations and with respect to other TPA requirements.  
The entry into force of a renegotiated or modernized NAFTA would likely take one of two forms: 
(1) a renegotiated agreement that would require changes to U.S. law or (2) changes to the 
agreement that could be made effective by presidential proclamation.121 If a renegotiated 
agreement requires changes to U.S. law, the President likely would seek expedited treatment of 
the implementing legislation under TPA, which would require consideration by Congress.122 TPA 
provides expedited procedures for automatic introduction of the implementing bill submitted by 
the President, attempts to ensure that both chambers will consider and vote on the bill, prohibits 
amendment, and limits debate if the President advances TPA’s principal trade negotiating 
objectives and meets various consultative, notification, and other requirements.123 TPA currently 
is in effect until July 1, 2021, provided that Congress does not pass an extension disapproval 
resolution in the 60 days prior to July 1, 2018.  
TPA’s requirement that the President fulfill consultation and reporting obligations helps preserve 
the congressional role on trade agreements by giving Congress the opportunity to influence the 
agreement before it is finalized. Should Congress determine that the President has failed to meet 
these and other requirements, it may decide that the implementing bill is not eligible to be 
considered under TPA rules. It would implement this decision by adopting a joint “procedural 
disapproval” resolution in both houses of Congress.124  
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On the other hand, the President could proclaim (i.e., declare) some modifications to NAFTA 
pursuant to existing statutory authority.125 NAFTA implementing legislation states that the 
President may proclaim modifications to certain rules of origin and tariffs under certain 
circumstances and subject to congressional consultation and layover provisions.126 It is also 
possible that the President could negotiate with Canada and Mexico on issues related to trade and 
investment with NAFTA partners that would not require changes to U.S. law. For example, the 
United States has numerous Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs) with other 
countries, which include commitments to promote investment and measures to expand and 
diversify trade, but do not have provisions to change tariffs or require changes to U.S. law.127 
Another example is the recent WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement that did not make any changes 
to U.S. law.  
The consultation and layover provisions are applicable to proclamations concerning 
 tariff modification, including acceleration of tariff staging;  
 modification of rules of origin specific to carpets and sweaters (Annex 300-B);  
 modifications to specific rules of origin (Annex 401);  
 automotive tracing requirement (Annexes 403.1, 403.2);  
 regional value-content provisions for certain autos (Annex 403.3); and 
 modification of rules-of-origin definitions. 
NAFTA rules of origin have been periodically amended in the past to reflect changes in industry 
production practices and sourcing patterns, as well as to ensure consistency following periodic 
amendments to the World Customs Organizations’ Harmonized Commodity Description and 
Coding System.128 For example, in 2013, NAFTA parties agreed to modifications liberalizing 
rules of origin by allowing more inputs from countries outside of the NAFTA region through a 
change in the tariff shift rules and/or by removing or reducing the regional value content 
requirements. The 2013 modifications affected a wide variety of articles including mineral fuels, 
plastics, optical and medical instruments, furniture, and smoking pipes. Some tariff phaseouts 
were also accelerated under NAFTA.129  
Economic and Broader Strategic Considerations  
Congress may examine the economic effects of NAFTA and the economic and broader strategic 
implications of possible withdrawal from NAFTA. President Trump has often stated the 
possibility of withdrawing from NAFTA. Some analysts maintain that these statements are not to 
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be taken lightly because the potential cost of such actions could be very significant for the U.S. 
economy.130 The United States shares strong economic ties with Mexico and Canada. Any 
disruption to the economic relationship could have adverse effects on investment, employment, 
productivity, and North American competitiveness. In addition, Mexico and Canada could 
consider imposing retaliatory tariffs on U.S. exports if the United States were to withdraw, while 
at the same time maintaining existing and pursuing new FTAs without the United States.  
From a broader strategic standpoint, the outcome of the renegotiations has implications for U.S. 
trade policy and the relationship with U.S. FTA partners. The Trump Administration has stated it 
will review and potentially renegotiate other existing FTAs, beginning with NAFTA, and pursue 
new bilateral FTAs, potentially with other TPP signatories, particularly Japan, and with other 
countries such as the United Kingdom.131 The results of the renegotiation and modernization of 
NAFTA may signal the future direction of trade policy under the Trump Administration and 
whether it will pursue bilateral agreements with TPP signatories or resume U.S. negotiations on 
the U.S.-EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) FTA.132  
The outcome of the renegotiations also has implications for the overarching relationship with 
Canada and Mexico. In general, U.S. relations with its North American partners have been close 
since NAFTA was negotiated in the early 1990s. Since 2005, the three countries have also made 
efforts to increase cooperation on economic and security issues through various endeavors, most 
notably by participating in trilateral summits known as the North American Leaders’ Summits, 
which began in 2005 under the Administration of George W. Bush. Bilateral efforts with Canada 
and Mexico were pursued by the Obama Administration and built upon the accomplishments of 
the working groups formed under previous summits. The outcome of NAFTA renegotiations has 
the potential to affect progress made over the past decade in regard to security, competitiveness, 
and issues of mutual interest. Mexican officials have suggested that if the Trump Administration 
adopts trade policies that run counter to Mexican interests, their government may review 
cooperation in other areas including migration and security.133 
Since NAFTA’s entry into force, trade among the United States, Canada, and Mexico has more 
than tripled. Canada and Mexico rank first and second, respectively, among U.S. export markets. 
Together the two countries accounted for 34% of U.S. exports and 26% of U.S. imports in 2016. 
NAFTA was instrumental in the development of supply chains throughout North America, 
especially in the auto industry. Many North American manufacturers work together as one 
integrated production region from cities in Canada, through the United States, and into numerous 
regions of Mexico. Labor-intensive parts can be manufactured in Mexico, where production costs 
are lower, while more complex parts are made in the United States. In the motor vehicle industry, 
for example, according to some estimates, the entire North American auto industry employs more 
than 1.5 million people and contributes significantly to the U.S. economy.134 New tariffs or trade 
barriers have the potential of disrupting these production chains, which could raise costs for U.S. 
consumers and possibly make goods and services produced throughout North America less 
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competitive in foreign markets. Proponents of renewed trade restrictions contend that they would 
bring back a share of global production to the United States. Opponents argue that they could 
cause thousands of lost jobs in all three countries and benefit countries like Germany and Japan, 
since auto producers might move their factories from Mexico to Germany, Japan, or elsewhere.135  
Mexico’s 2018 Presidential Elections and Perspective  
Mexico has stated its willingness to negotiate with the United States and Canada to modernize 
NAFTA and has set its own negotiating objectives. These objectives reportedly serve as the basis 
for Mexico’s position at the talks.136 The Mexican government has said that it is important to meet 
the ambitious time line of completing negotiations by the end of 2017 before the country’s 2018 
campaign begins so that the negotiations are not politicized. Mexico’s Economic Minister 
Ildefonso Guajardo said the idea was to “do the handshake” in 2017 to allow enough time to sign 
an agreement before the end of 2018.137 Some analysts maintain the U.S. relationship has been 
“compartmentalized” in that trade relations have always remained separate from security 
cooperation and other aspects in the relationship, but that this could change depending on the 
outcome of the negotiations.138  
As Mexico’s 2018 elections approach, observers will be watching to see what impact, if any, 
bilateral trade relations have on the Mexican elections.139 Some analysts are concerned that 
Mexicans may elect leftist populist Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who would be less inclined to 
continue close bilateral cooperation, if they feel that other candidates would not adequately 
defend Mexico’s sovereignty vis-á-vis the United States.140 Lopez Obrador’s opponents denounce 
him as a populist who would seek socialist policies that would set back trilateral economic 
cooperation. Already he has said that if he wins he will review and possibly revise oil contracts 
signed after Mexico’s major energy reforms of 2013, which may affect U.S. investors.141  
Mexico’s Economic Ministry stated that Mexico’s objective is to have an expedited negotiation 
that maintains the benefits of NAFTA, but which also serves as a platform for the modernization 
of the agreement.142 U.S. NAFTA negotiating objectives include seeking provisions on 
anticorruption such as criminalizing government corruption. The Mexican public may support 
efforts to address corruption, a top concern among the population and a barrier to investment in 
the country.143 Some Mexican officials have stated that the government is willing to address 
anticorruption provisions in the negotiations, but it is not clear how this would be addressed in an 
FTA. Similarly, while Mexican workers may support a discussion of the need for Mexican 
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businesses to raise wages, the government considers that a matter of domestic policy that should 
not be discussed in the NAFTA agreement.144  
Some analysts are concerned that bilateral cooperation and close economic linkages could be 
jeopardized if the Trump Administration introduces protectionist trade measures such as tariffs or 
quotas in the renegotiation. Others maintain that Mexico’s objective to establish a mutually 
beneficial working relationship with the Trump Administration is difficult but achievable.145 The 
outcome of the negotiations could have significant implications for bilateral relations with 
Mexico. At the time of the fourth round of negotiations, Mexican officials accused President 
Trump of initiating a “protectionist war” with proposals that would be difficult for Mexico to 
accept.146 Mexico’s Foreign Minister reportedly stated that terminating NAFTA could bring 
relations with the United States to a “breaking point,” raising the possibility that cooperation in 
areas such as drug trafficking and migration could be affected.147  
Implications of Mexico and Canada’s Market-Opening Initiatives 
A significant issue for congressional consideration is Mexico and Canada’s ongoing trade 
initiatives and how this may affect U.S. industries. If Mexico and Canada continue trade and 
investment liberalization efforts with other countries, it may affect current trade and investment 
trends with the United States. For example, although Mexico depends heavily on the United 
States as a trading partner and has extensive supply chains with U.S. producers, it has been taking 
numerous initiatives to decrease its reliance on the United States. This may open the door to more 
investment from other countries, including China.  
Some observers contend that Mexico’s trade policy is the most open in the world.148 It has a total 
of 11 free trade agreements involving 46 countries. These include agreements with most countries 
in the Western Hemisphere, as well as agreements with Israel, Japan, and the European Union. 
Mexico is also a party to the Pacific Alliance, a regional trade integration initiative formed by 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. The trade bloc’s main purpose is for members to forge 
stronger economic ties and integration with the Asia-Pacific region. In addition to reducing trade 
barriers, the Alliance has sought to integrate in areas including financial markets and the free 
movement of people.149 Earlier this year, the Pacific Alliance admitted Singapore, Australia, New 
Zealand, and Canada as associate members as a first step to deepening the relationship.150 Canada 
also has numerous trade agreements with other countries, including the pending ratification of the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with the European Union, and FTAs 
with South Korea, Israel, and several Latin American countries.  
Another important consideration is the current status of TPP, and the likelihood of other TPP 
countries moving forward without the United States. This could have implications for U.S. goods, 
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services, and investment in the Asia-Pacific region if other countries gain market access through a 
new FTA similar to the TPP, but without the United States. The United States gave notice on 
January 30, 2017, that it does not intend to ratify the agreement, effectively ending the U.S. 
ratification process and TPP’s potential entry into force, unless the Administration changes its 
position.151 Mexico and Canada have both expressed interest in moving forward with the TPP 
without the United States. Although the agreement was written in a way to prevent its entry into 
force without the United States, Mexico’s economy minister has, on numerous occasions, stated 
that Mexico and other members could remove that restriction or move forward with a similar 
agreement.152 According to a June 2017 study, Canada and Mexico could have potential gains 
from a “TPP-11,” mainly because they would have increased access to other TPP markets, 
especially Japan, without having to compete with U.S. exports.153 The study projects that 
Canada’s exports to TPP countries, without the United States, would increase by 4.7% by 2035 
and that Mexico’s would increase by 3.1%. The study states that Canada’s agricultural exports, 
particularly beef, would benefit from access to the Japanese market.154  
Outlook 
Negotiators from the United States, Canada, and Mexico stated after the first round of 
negotiations that they are committed to completing the negotiations quickly. They agreed to hold 
seven rounds of negotiations at three-week intervals through December 2017. On August 16, 
2017, USTR Robert Lighthizer, Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland, and 
Mexican Secretary of the Economy Ildefonso Guajardo launched the first round of talks in 
Washington, DC. After these initial talks concluded, they announced that the three governments 
are committed to “an accelerated and comprehensive negotiation process that will upgrade our 
agreement and establish 21st century standards to the benefit of our citizens.”155  
The outlook on NAFTA renegotiation and modernization is uncertain. Potential major revision of 
a U.S. FTA is unprecedented since the first U.S. FTA was concluded with Israel in the late 1980s. 
On one hand, NAFTA is 23 years old and with the U.S. withdrawal from TPP, renegotiation 
would enable the NAFTA parties to significantly update the agreement in line with current U.S. 
trade negotiating objectives and more recent U.S. FTAs. Areas of convergence could include 
major provisions in TPP to which all countries were party. These provisions would arguably 
update NAFTA by addressing new trade policy issues and barriers that have surfaced in the global 
economy since NAFTA was first concluded in 1994. These issues address digital and services 
trade, state-owned enterprises’ roles in commercial activity, enhanced intellectual property rights, 
and more enforceable labor and environmental commitments, among other issues found in more 
recent U.S. trade agreements.  
On the other hand, there appear to be key areas of difference on major issues, including on rules 
of origin, dispute settlement review of trade remedy decisions, labor, environment, and NAFTA’s 
role in the trilateral U.S. trade deficit. For example, at the second round of negotiations, Canada 
introduced new provisions on labor and the environment. Canada’s lead negotiator stated that 
NAFTA should have provisions related to the environment that would prevent a country from 
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weakening climate-change policies to attract investment.156 The negotiations could lead to more 
lengthy talks, a stalemate, maintaining NAFTA as is, or a possible withdrawal from the 
agreement.  
The future direction and ultimate outcome of NAFTA renegotiations have significant policy 
implications for the United States going forward for U.S. trade policy, the economies of the 
United States, Canada and Mexico, and the broader relationships among all NAFTA parties.  
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